Sovereignty, Territory, and Population in Jean Bodin's "République" by Miglietti, Sara
Accepted version before copy-editing. Published in French Studies 72/1 (2018), pp. 17-34 
SOVEREIGNTY, TERRITORY, AND POPULATION IN JEAN BODIN’S RÉPUBLIQUE 
 




This article offers a reinterpretation of Jean Bodin’s Six livres de la République (1576), a work 
that deeply transformed European political discourse at the time of the French Wars of Religion 
and that had important repercussions on the later ‘reason of state’ tradition. Highlighting the 
ties between Bodin’s definition of sovereignty in Book 1 and his discussion of demographic 
growth and territorial expansion in Books 4, 5, and 6, the article shows that Bodin’s critical 
contribution to early modern political thought, far from being limited to his reframing of the 
juristic concept of souveraineté or maiestas, extends to his novel understanding of the territory 
as a non-juridical ‘political technology’. Through an examination of Bodin’s work and its later 
reception, the article argues that Bodin’s insights about territorial and demographic matters 
played a fundamental role in the early modern process of ‘territorialising politics’, by 
redefining the very terms in which the notion of ‘territory’ would be understood and discussed 





La souveraineté est la puissance absoluë et perpetuelle d’une Republique […] il n’y a 
ny iurisconsulte, ny philosophe politique, qui l’ayt definie: iaçoit que c’est le point 
principal, et le plus necessaire d’estre entendu au traité de la Republique.1 
 
Rarely has a single sentence marked an author’s destiny more strongly. It is essentially 
on account of these words, written in the dark days of the sixteenth-century wars of religion, 
that the French jurist Jean Bodin (1529/30–1596) earned his enduring place in canonical 
histories of political thought, where he consistently figures as one of the fathers of a ‘modern’ 
 
1 Jean Bodin, Les six livres de la République/De republica libri sex. Livre I/Liber I, ed. Mario 
Turchetti with Nicolas de Araujo (Paris: Garnier, 2013), 1.8.1, p. 444. All quotations from 
Book 1 of the République/De republica are taken from this edition, henceforth quoted as Six 
livres. All quotations from the remaining five books are taken from either the French edition 
of 1579 (Paris: Dupuys), henceforth quoted as République; or the Latin editio princeps of 1586 
(Paris: Dupuys), henceforth quoted as De republica. Two abridged English translations of the 
République exist, one by M.J. Tooley (Six Books of the Commonwealth, Oxford: Blackwell, 
1955) and another by J. Franklin (On Sovereignty, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
1992), while in 1962 Kenneth D. McRae oversaw the reprint of the 1606 integral translation 
by Richard Knolles, based on a conflation of the French and Latin texts (The Six Bookes of a 
Commonweale [Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1962]). To this date, the only 
complete modern edition of the République is Margherita Isnardi Parente’s excellent Italian 
translation, based on careful comparison between various French and Latin editions (I sei libri 
dello Stato, 3 vols, Torino: UTET, 1964-1996; Vols 2 and 3 prepared in collaboration with 
Diego Quaglioni).  
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concept of sovereignty.2 There is no denying that this concept occupies an important role in 
Bodin’s thought. Sovereignty (souveraineté, maiestas) is the pivotal notion around which 
Bodin structures his political masterpiece, Les Six livres de la République (1576), self-
translated into Latin in 1586 (De Republica libri sex); and in the passage quoted above, he 
clearly shows pride in stressing that no one before him had given this concept the attention it 
deserved. Bodin himself seems to tell us that his theory of sovereignty represents his most 
important breakthrough and the essential core of his legacy.  
What is certain is that modern critics have often given disproportionate importance to 
the first book of the République, which contains the famous chapter ‘De la souveraineté’ 
(Chapter 9 in the 1576 editio princeps, Chapter 8 in all subsequent editions), while the 
remaining five books, which make up almost 80% of the entire work, have attracted 
considerably less attention.3 Books 4, 5, and 6, where Bodin discusses crucial issues relating 
to territory, demographics, and territorial expansion, have been especially overlooked. Some 
scholars have gone so far as to actively deny the existence of a discourse about territory in 
Bodin’s République: in the words of one renowned historian, this masterpiece of early modern 
political thought would indeed be ‘notable for its utter lack of attention, and even mention, of 
territory’.4  
This article represents a first step towards rectifying this view. Moving from the 
assumption (increasingly well recognised among Bodinian scholars) that the République is and 
must be read as an organic whole,5 the article proposes a reexamination of the work that weaves 
together Bodin’s definition of sovereignty in Book 1 with his discussion of territory and 
population in Books 4, 5, and 6. The article is divided into three sections: while the first section 
shows that an isolated reading of Book 1 might give the false impression that Bodin does not 
pay particular attention to the physical territory as an object of statecraft, section 2 
 
2 See, for instance, J.W. Allen, A History of Political Thought in the Sixteenth Century 
(London: Methuen, 1928); Quentin Skinner, The Foundations of Modern Political Thought, 2 
vols (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1978); J. S. McClelland, A History of Western 
Political Thought (London: Routledge, 2005); J.H. Burns with Mark Goldie (eds), The 
Cambridge History of Political Thought, 1450-1700 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
2008). 
3 This critical imbalance is particularly evident in certain areas of scholarship, especially 
general and/or thematic histories of political thought, and the distorted image of Bodin’s ideas 
and intentions that it fosters has often been noted and denounced by Bodinian scholars. The 
point was raised most recently by Diego Quaglioni in an unpublished communication on 
‘Cesare Vasoli e il rinnovamento degli studi su Bodin e il pensiero politico del Rinascimento’, 
presented at the conference ‘Cesare Vasoli tra Medioevo e Rinascimento’ (Florence, Istituto 
Nazionale di Studi sul Rinascimento, 6 June 2014).  
4 Thus Lauren Benton in her otherwise remarkable A Search for Sovereignty. Law and 
Geography in European Empires, 1400–1900 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
2010), p. 287. Benton’s view is echoed by Annabel Brett in Changes of State: Nature and the 
Limits of the City in Early Modern Natural Law (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2011), 
p. 170. 
5 For a similar perspective, see Marie-Dominique Couzinet, ‘On Bodin’s Method’, in The 
Reception of Bodin, ed. by Howell Lloyd (Leiden: Brill, 2013), pp. 39-66; Mark Greengrass, 
‘The Experiential World of Jean Bodin’, in The Reception of Bodin, pp. 67-96.  
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demonstrates that an holistic reading of the République allows us to appreciate the many 
important contributions that Bodin gave to emerging ideas of territory and population in early 
modern Europe. The conclusions bring further into focus the question of Bodin’s legacy, with 
particular respect to the ‘territorialisation’ of early modern political discourse—that is to say, 
the identification of territory as a privileged locus of governmental action.6 While it is generally 
assumed that these developments only took place much later and that Bodin’s thought was 
largely marginal — if not opposed — to them,7 this article argues that the Frenchman actually 
played a crucial role in the process of ‘territorialising politics’, as he redefined the very terms 
in which ‘territory’ was to be viewed and discussed in the following decades.8  
The stakes of this reexamination are high. It is not just a matter of pointing out a gap in 
Bodinian scholarship or of reassessing a particular aspect of the Frenchman’s reception in later 
periods. While these are certainly important aims of this article, its main goal is to clarify how 
Bodin negotiates the relationship between the ‘juridical’ and the ‘political’ in his understanding 
of sovereign power — in other words, to explain how Bodinian sovereignty actually works. 
Bodin’s discussion of territory and population, as we shall see, plays a key role in this respect, 
as it allows us to appreciate how Bodin’s abstract definition of sovereignty in 1.9 (1.8 in later 
editions) relates to his views on concrete governmental matters in other parts of the work. This 
article should then be seen as a first step towards a reconsideration of a much larger and more 
essential problem: that of the nature and functioning of Bodin’s sovereignty — if not, perhaps, 
of sovereignty in general. 
This is a vexing question in Bodinian scholarship, and one that has coloured 
understandings of Bodin’s contribution to Western political ideas. A long-dominant (and still 
influential) interpretive tradition has stressed the juridical nature of Bodinian sovereignty to 
the point of denying that other, non-juridical kinds of discourses take place in the République.9 
This view, however, can be challenged on several grounds. While it is not incorrect to say that 
Bodin’s chief goal in the République is to rephrase the problem of ‘the political’ by putting the 
concepts of sovereignty and law at the centre of his analysis, we should not hastily conclude 
 
6 Stuart Elden, ‘Land, Terrain, Territory’, Progress in Human Geography, 34/6 (2010), 799–
817 (801). 
7 See, for instance, Michel Foucault, Security, Territory, Population. Lectures at the Collège 
de France, 1977–1978, trans. by Graham Burchell, ed. by Michel Senellart (New York: 
Picador, 2007), p. 1 and 20-23 (where Foucault pinpoints the eighteenth century as the time in 
which the physical territory, or milieu, was turned into a field of governmental intervention); 
Romain Descendre, ‘Raison d’État, puissance et économie. Le mercantilisme de Giovanni 
Botero’, Revue de métaphysique et de morale, 39 (2003), 311–21 (315); Romain Descendre, 
L’État du Monde. Giovanni Botero entre raison d’État et géopolitique (Geneva: Droz, 2009), 
pp. 213–44. For a different perspective, see Stuart Elden, ‘How Should We Do the History of 
Territory?’, Territory, Politics, Governance, 1/1 (2013), 5-20. 
8 Descendre, L’État du Monde, 213. Unless otherwise noted, all translations are my own. 
9 See, for instance, Descendre, ‘Raison d’État, puissance et économie’, which partly builds on 
previous work by Michel Senellart: Machiavélisme et raison d’État (Paris: Presses 
Universitaires de France, 1989) and ‘La Raison d’État antimachiavélienne. Essai de 
problématisation’, in La Raison d’État: politique et rationalité, ed. by Christian Lazzeri and 
Dominique Reynié (Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1992), pp. 15–42. Descendre 
himself, however, takes a different and more convincing stance in L’État du Monde, p. 178. 
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that the République as a whole does nothing more than this. As Thomas Berns has recently 
argued, Bodin is at once the ‘first major thinker of sovereignty’ as an essentially juridical form 
of exercising state power, and a theorist of other kinds of political strategies, which take place 
in the margins of the law, filling as it were its blind spots, and complementing the juridical 
approach of sovereignty through the non-juridical approach of ‘governmentality’.10 Berns 
shows that Bodin’s meditation on the role of the intermediary bodies (‘corps et collèges’), on 
the ‘harmonic’ distribution of offices and prizes, on census and censorship, as well as his 
insightful remarks on military strategy, trade, currency, and taxation, all testify to the presence 
of a substantial non-juridical strand of political reflection in the République. The same, this 
article argues, can be said of Bodin’s discussion of demographic growth and territorial 
expansion, which unfolds throughout the République but becomes especially prominent in 
Books 4, 5, and 6, and which represents another major locus of Bodin’s reflection on the 
‘governmental’ side of statecraft.  
 
Two concepts of city: the physical and the juridical in the République 
 
The obvious place to start looking for Bodin’s views on sovereignty, territory, and population 
is Book 1 of the République, where the Frenchman lays out the groundwork for what follows. 
This includes his famous definitions of state, sovereign power, family, citizen, and so forth; it 
also includes a clear distinction between two concepts of city — a physical concept, expressed 
by the word ville in the French edition and by the Latin term urbs in Bodin’s self-translation 
of 1586; and a juridical concept, corresponding to the word cité in French and to civitas in 
Latin.11 ‘La ville ne fait pas la cité’, says Bodin: spatial unity — the fact of living together in 
one place, which characterises the ville — is not relevant for defining the cité, which remains 
such even when its members are ‘fort eslongnés les uns des autres et en plusieurs païs’. What 
instead constitutes the cité is a juridical fact: the fact that its members, no matter where they 
live, are all equally subject ‘au commandement des seigneurs souverains et à ses edicts et 
ordonnances’. Conversely, where there is no such common subjection to a single sovereign, 
‘ce n’est point cité… ains c’est une pure anarchie’, even if the physical city is ‘bien bastie et 
murée, et qui plus est remplie de peuple’.12  
The legal tradition in which Bodin was steeped made no clear distinction between 
different ways of referring to the city: the Italian jurist Bartolus of Sassoferrato (1314-1357), 
for instance, used civitas and castrum (‘fortified place’) as interchangeable terms.13 Bodin, on 
the other hand, carefully distinguishes between a spatial and a juridical level of analysis. ‘Le 
 
10 Thomas Berns, Souveraineté, droit et gouvernementalité. Lectures du politique moderne à 
partir de Bodin (Clamécy: Éditions Léo Scheer, 2005). 
11 Such a distinction is not entirely original. It can be found, for instance, in Cicero’s Pro Sestio 
(XLII.91) and in Leonardo Bruni’s letters: Epistularum Libri VIII (Hamburg: Felginer, 1724), 
p. 85 (quot. in Descendre, L’État du Monde, p. 175). See also Brett, Changes of State, pp. 1–
3. Bodin is not always scrupulous in his use of these terms: there is at least one case where he 
translates the French villes with the Latin civitates (République, 2.1, ed. 1579, p. 226; De 
republica, 2.1, ed. 1586, p. 180).  
12 Bodin, Six livres, 1.6.8, p. 332.  
13 See Stuart Elden, The Birth of Territory (Chicago: Chicago University Press, 2013), p. 225. 
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mot de cité,’ he writes, ‘est un mot de droit, qui ne signifie point un lieu ni une place, comme 
le mot de ville, que les Latins appellent urbem, ab urbo, id est aratro’.14 In order to show that 
it is not merely a matter of words (‘la difference ne gist pas en paroles simplement’), Bodin 
recalls that after defeating Carthage the Romans had promised the vanquished not to touch 
their cité: ‘leur cité leur demeureroit, avec tous les droits, privileges et libertés dont ils avoyent 
tousjous usé’.15 Hence, the Carthaginians were shocked and outraged when the Romans asked 
them to ‘vuider et emporter de la ville tout ce qu’ils pourroyent’, since the city was to be razed 
to the ground: 
 
Les habitants estonnés remonstrent que le senat les avoit asseurés que leur cité ne seroit 
point rasée. On leur dict que la foy leur seroit gardée de poinct en poinct; mais que la 
cité n’estoit pas attachée au lieu ni aux murailles de Carthage; ainsi les povres habitans 
furent contrains de sortir et abandonner la ville au feu qui y fut mis par les Romains, 
qui n’en eussent pas eu si bon marché, si plustost les ambassadeurs eussent entendu la 
difference de ville et cité.16 
 
As this sad anecdote shows, ville and cité are quite different things. Indeed, as Bodin 
goes on to note, ‘la ville peut estre sans cité et la cité sans ville’. Now, since Bodin has defined 
sovereignty as primarily concerned with the juridical entity of the cité, rather than with the 
spatial entity of the ville, it would only seem natural that his attention in the République should 
focus on the ‘cité sans ville’ (such as Carthage was after its destruction by the Romans) as 
opposed to the ‘ville sans cité’. This emphasis on a juridical concept of the city (cité), as 
opposed to one of the city as a physical space (ville), seems to confirm the idea, recently 
defended by some scholars, that Bodin is uninterested in the physical territory as an object of 
statecraft.17    
At first sight, several elements appear to corroborate this view. The territory is not 
merely absent in this first book of the République; it is programmatically excluded from the 
preliminary discussion on state and sovereignty. Indeed, after confirming that ‘ce n’est pas la 
ville ny les personnes qui font la cité, mais l’union d’un peuple sous une seigneurie 
souveraine’,18 Bodin points out that size (whether it be measured according to territorial 
extension or number of inhabitants) is completely irrelevant for qualifying a state as such:  
 
Comme le ciron ou la formi sont aussi bien nombrés entre les animaux comme les 
elephans, aussi le droit gouvernement de trois familles avec puissance souveraine fait 
aussi bien une Republique comme d’une grande seigneurie […] un petit roy est autant 
souverain que le plus grand monarque de la terre […]. Et au contraire la plus grande 
 
14 Bodin, Six livres, 1.6.7, p. 332. See Diego Quaglioni, ‘Civitas: appunti per una riflessione 
sull’idea di città nel pensiero politico dei giuristi medievali’, in Le ideologie della città europea 
dall’Umanesimo al Romanticismo, ed. by Vittorio Conti (Firenze: Olschki, 1993), pp. 59–76.  
15 Bodin, Six livres, 1.6.9, p. 336. 
16 Bodin, Six livres, 1.6.9, p. 336.  
17 Benton, A Search for Sovereignty, p. 287; Brett, Changes of State, p. 170. 
18 Bodin, Six livres, 1.2.3, p. 186. 
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cité ou monarchie et la mieux peuplée qui soit sur la terre n’est pas plus Republique ny 
cité que la plus petite.19 
 
Hence, if one were to judge by Book 1 only, it would seem that Bodin has indeed no 
interest in the actual territory, as he actively discards its spatial and physical qualities in favour 
of its abstract, juridical dimension. One could certainly object that sovereignty, as we learn 
from the famous definition of ‘state’ in the opening chapter of the work, is exercised on both 
people and spaces: indeed, when Bodin says that ‘Republique est un droit gouvernement de 
plusieurs mesnages, et de ce qui leur est commun, avec puissance souveraine’,20 he seems to 
be referring to those ‘choses communes ou publiques’ that are listed in the following chapter, 
and many of which are indeed physical spaces: ‘le pourpris de la cité’, ‘les rues’, ‘les murailles’, 
‘les places’, ‘les temples’, ‘les marchés’, and so forth.21 Such ‘choses communes’ are of the 
essence when it comes to defining the state, since ‘outre la souveraineté, il faut qu’il y ait 
quelque chose de commun, et de public… car ce n’est pas Republique s’il n’y a rien de 
public’.22 Nevertheless, the way in which Bodin chooses to describe these ‘choses communes 
ou publiques’ is, once again, strictly juridical. Even when the Frenchman is dealing with 
physical spaces, what matters to him is not the number, features or location of these spaces 
within the ville, but the fact that they are placed under a common authority and belong to the 
cité as a whole. In this respect, it is particularly meaningful that he would prefer the somewhat 
paradoxical phrasing ‘pourpris de la cité’ — possibly a tentative translation of Sextus 
Pomponius’ definition of ‘territory’ in the Digest (‘territorium est universitas agrorum intra 
fines cuiusque civitatis’23) — to a more consequent ‘pourpris de la ville’.  
The above conclusion — namely that Bodin takes no interest in territory as a physical 
space — is where an isolated reading of Book 1 of the République inevitably seems to lead us. 
Yet as soon as one steps beyond Book 1 to explore the five books that follow, one witnesses 
the progressive unfolding of a rich and nuanced discourse about territory that reveals the 
complexity of Bodin’s conception of statecraft, as well as his own craftiness as a writer. 
Bodin’s recurring strategy in the République is to take the very slender definitions provided in 
Book 1 and augment them in the following books, usually by reintegrating precisely the extra-
juridical elements that he had previously discarded. In so doing, Bodin seems to point to the 
existence of a gap between the definition of sovereignty and its actual functioning. While 
defining sovereignty requires the expulsion of all extraneous elements in order for its juridical 
core to shine more brightly,24 a much more nuanced and multifaceted approach is needed when 
it comes to discussing how a state should be run in practice, since actual governance involves 
 
19 Bodin, Six livres, 1.2.3–4, p. 186.  
20 Bodin, Six livres, 1.1.1, p. 156. Emphasis added. 
21 Bodin, Six livres, 1.2.5, p. 188. The Latin edition adds ‘porticus’, ‘theatra’, ‘publica aedificia’ 
and ‘pascua communia’ (Bodin, Six livres, 1.2.5, p. 189). 
22 Bodin, Six livres, 1.2.5, pp. 188–190.  
23 ‘The territorium is the sum of the lands within the boundaries of a civitas’, D50.16.239.8 
(translated in Elden, The Birth of Territory, p. 222).  
24 See Bodin, Six livres, 1.1.1, p. 156, and 1.6.11, p. 340; compare Jürgen Dennert, 
‘Bemerkungen zum politischen Denken Jean Bodins’, in Jean Bodin. Actes du Congrès 
international de Munich, ed. by Horst Denzer (Munich: C.H. Beck, 1973), pp. 213–32. 
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activity on several levels, not all of which juridical. What Bodin leaves out on the preliminary 
level of definition (Book 1) is thus retrieved and potentiated once he sets out to analyse practice 
in more detail (Books 2 through 6).25  
Several instances of this strategy come to mind. Bodin’s revision of the standard 
definitions of ‘citoyen’,26 ‘République’,27 and ‘souveraineté’28 in Book 1 largely derives from 
a quest for essentiality (‘il faut chercher en toutes choses la fin principale’), which leads him 
to leave aside elements such as wellbeing, happiness, social status, political participation, and 
mode of government (‘gouvernement’ or ‘gubernandi ratio’). Indeed, a citizen is a citizen 
regardless of the role that he occupies in society; a state is a state no matter how rich, happy or 
large it is; a sovereign’s legitimacy does not depend on how he uses his power, but on his titles 
to rule; and sovereignty, which is single and indivisible, excludes by definition the possibility 
of being shared.  Nevertheless, all of the elements that Bodin leaves aside at this stage feature 
extensively in his subsequent discussion of governmental matters. Thus Book 2 introduces a 
vital distinction between ‘form of state’ and ‘form of government’, which allows Bodin to show 
not only how power can in fact be shared (on the practical level of government as opposed to 
the juridical level of sovereignty), but also that the way in which such power is used does matter 
and should indeed be taken into careful account in assessing the workings of a state.29 An entire 
chapter (3.8) is then added from scratch to the Latin edition in order to elucidate the importance 
of social status (‘ordres’, or estates) in the life of any organised community. Considerable 
attention is also paid throughout the work to the citizens’ happiness and wellbeing: indeed, on 
more than one occasion Bodin presents their ‘vivre heureusement’ as an ultimate touchstone 
of state success.30     
The above considerations also hold true for Bodin’s reflections on territory. In addition 
to a substantial portion of Book 5, Chapter 1 (the famous chapter on ‘climate theory’, itself all 
too often read in ‘splendid isolation’ from the rest of the work), there are several other places 
in the République where Bodin discusses issues that broadly relate to the physical territory, its 
 
25 A larger problem should be raised here concerning the relationship between empirical 
description and norm, the universality of definitions and the relativity of practice, and so forth. 
Although this issue is still far from having received the attention it deserves, some helpful 
remarks can be found in Horst Denzer, ‘Bodins Staatsformenlehre’ and Kenneth D. McRae, 
‘Bodin and the Development of Empirical Political Science’, both in Jean Bodin. Actes du 
Congrès international de Munich, pp. 233–44 and 333–42. Also see Pierre Magnard, ‘Vérité 
et pluralisme chez Jean Bodin’, in Jean Bodin a 400 anni dalla morte. Bilancio storiografico 
e prospettive di ricerca, ed. by Artemio Enzo Baldini (= special issue of Il pensiero politico, 
30/2 (1997), pp. 267–75).  
26 Bodin, Six livres, 1.6.11, pp. 340–42. 
27 Bodin, Six livres, 1.1.4, pp. 162–64. 
28 Bodin, Six livres, 1.8.1, p. 444. 
29 See the distinction between ‘monarchie royale’, ‘monarchie seigneuriale’ and ‘monarchie 
tyrannique’ in 2.2–4, and the discussion of the three types of justice (‘arithmétique’, 
‘géométrique’ and ‘harmonique’) in République, 6.6. 
30 See, for instance, République, 6.4 (ed. 1579, p. 962), where Bodin argues that monarchy 
should be preferred to aristocracy and democracy as it better promotes ‘la seureté et vie 
heureuse des sujects’ (an idea confirmed a bit further in the same chapter, under the heading 
‘Les subjects sont bien-heureux sous un grand monarque’).   
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ideal extension, and its relationship to the people who inhabit it, thus reversing the systematic 
disregard displayed in Book 1. The next section will examine some of these places in order to 
shed light on the role that territory and population play in Bodin’s understanding of statecraft 
in action.    
 
How big is good? Demographic growth and territorial expansion in the République 
 
Reflecting in Book 1 on the conditions that allow states to thrive, Bodin writes:  
 
La republique doit avoir un territoire suffisant et lieu capable pour les habitans, la 
fertilité d’un pais assez plantureux et quantité de bestail pour la nourriture et vestemens 
des subjects: et pour les maintenir en santé, la douceur du ciel, la temperature de l’air, 
la bonté des eaux: et pour la defense et retraite du peuple, les matieres propres à bastir 
maisons et places fortes, si le lieu de soy n’est assez couvert et defensable.31 
 
Bodin’s self-translation of 1586 slightly but significantly altered this passage: the 
physical features listed in the French original are no longer presented in the Latin version as 
prerequisites without which no state can exist (‘la republique doit avoir…’), but simply as 
contributing factors that promote collective wellbeing (‘Beatior tamen futura civitas est, quae 
his aucta virtutibus, fundos habuerit ubertate fertiles, aut quantum satis est ad civium 
alimenta…’).32 Such a shift seems consistent with Bodin’s general effort to distinguish what is 
essential for the very existence of a state from what is helpful but not strictly necessary (and 
thus superfluous on the definitory level). It is clear from the Latin edition that Bodin conceives 
of territorial extension as belonging to the latter category. Consequently, in the Latin edition 
the emphasis falls on qualitative, rather than quantitative, properties of the territory, such as 
the fact of being ‘rich and fertile’, or at least ‘fertile enough for the nourishment of the 
citizens’.33  
As for the original French passage, it is, upon a closer look, remarkably vague. ‘La 
republique doit avoir un territoire suffisant’, says Bodin, but exactly how much is ‘enough’ 
remains unclear. Of course, it can be conjectured that the answer will have to vary depending 
on the size of the population: the place has to be ‘capable pour les habitans’, which means of 
an adequate size for accommodating (and providing for) them all. By writing thus, Bodin was 
situating himself within a longstanding tradition of philosophico-political thought that inferred 
the ideal size of a state’s territory from the desired size of the population, as opposed to 
calculating the optimal rate of demographic growth that a given territory is able to sustain. 
Although the end result is the same (namely, an equilibrium between territorial extension and 
 
31 Bodin, Six livres, 1.1.5, p. 168. See Elden, The Birth of Territory, p. 264. For its attention to 
concrete territorial features, this passage may be seen as a notable exception to the rule 
formulated above.  
32 ‘However that commonwealth will be happier, which in addition to these virtues will also 
have rich and fertile lands — fertile enough, at least, for the nourishment of the citizens …’, 
Six livres, 1.1.5, p. 169. Emphasis added. 
33 Bodin, Six livres, 1.1.5, p. 169. Elden makes a similar remark about Francis Bacon (The Birth 
of Territory, p. 288), but fails to note this point in his discussion of Bodin (p. 264).   
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demographic growth), the fact that this goal is pursued in opposite ways is not without 
importance. Richard Harrow Feen, who has identified insightful ideas on the balance between 
population and resources in Plato’s Laws, has also observed that Plato’s decision to set the 
number of households at 5040 was the result not so much of a concern for overpopulation as 
of a desire to regulate inheritance in order to avoid economic disparity.34 In Plato’s model, the 
ideal number of households is fixed based on criteria that have nothing to do with the actual 
capacity of the territory to sustain them: the optimal size of the population is determined a 
priori and remains the same regardless of surrounding physical conditions. Similarly, the order 
in which Aristotle discusses the ideal size of the population and the optimal size of the territory 
in Book 7 of his Politics points to the priority of the former on the latter: population defines 
territory, and not the other way round.35   
This was still the dominant way of thinking about demographic and territorial matters 
in the sixteenth century.36 By the time Bodin was writing his République, however, the ancient 
Greek model prescribing relatively small cities and population control was increasingly 
challenged by a different paradigm, which regarded population growth as inherently good. The 
exact causes of such a shift from population control to ‘populationism’ (to be understood here 
simply as any ‘doctrine that favours high population growth’)37 are not entirely clear, nor is it 
clear when the shift took place, although the common view that Bodin would have been the 
first to uphold populationist ideas is debatable to say the least.38 Nevertheless, in Book 5 of the 
République Bodin does distance himself clearly from the ancient opinion (which he also 
ascribes to Thomas More) that population growth should be restrained by all possible means, 
including forced migration, abortion, and the prohibition of further urban development.39 
According to Bodin, such measures rest on the wrong assumption that a large population is a 
 
34 Richard Harrow Feen, ‘Keeping the Balance: Ancient Greek Philosophical Concerns with 
Population and Environment’, Population and Environment: A Journal of Interdisciplinary 
Studies, 17/6 (1996), 447–458: 451. 
35 See Aristotle, Politics, 7.4–5 [1325–1326]. Jeff Chuska rightly raises the problem of why 
‘Aristotle discusses the population size of the best regime before he considers its territory’, but 
his answer is only partially convincing (Aristotle’s Best Regime: A Reading of Aristotle’s 
Politics, VII.1–10 [Lanham, MD: University Press of America, 2000], p. 79). 
36 Compare for instance Francesco Patrizi, De institutione Reipublicae libri IX, 7.12 (Strasburg: 
Zetzner, 1594, p. 340). Machiavelli seems to innovate on this model: indeed, his discussion of 
territorial expansion in the Discorsi is at least partly inspired by non-demographic concerns, 
particularly by a meditation on the strategic necessity of ‘expanding’ for preserving one’s own 
state (see Discorsi, 2.19).  
37 Yves Charbit, The Classical Foundations of Population Thought: From Plato to Quesnay 
(Dordrecht: Springer, 2010), p. 2. 
38 Charles Emil Stangeland’s classic study Pre-Malthusian Doctrines of Population (New 
York: Columbia University Press, 1904) offers several good examples of populationist ideas 
before Bodin (see especially Chapters 1 and 3). In particular, Machiavelli clearly argues that 
political greatness cannot be achieved without a large population (Discorsi, 2.3).  
39 République, 5.2 (ed. 1579, p. 703). 
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negative and dangerous thing, whilst in truth ‘il ne faut jamais craindre qu’il y ait trop de 
sujects, trop de citoyens: veu qu’il n’y a richesse, ni force que d’hommes’.40  
Since Bodin unequivocally endorses unrestricted population growth, it seems 
reasonable to assume that he should also be a strong supporter of territorial expansion. Indeed, 
if the territory has to be ‘capable pour les habitans’, as Bodin himself concedes, high 
demographic growth will require an expansionist policy to meet increased demand for space 
and resources. Indeed, the direct proportionality between the size of a country and that of its 
population is explicitly theorised in a passage from Book 4:   
 
Or ces changemens [= disruptive constitutional changes] adviennent plustost, et plus 
souvent quand la Republique est de petite estendue, que s’il y a beaucoup de pays et de 
sugets: car une petite Republique est bien tost divisee en deux ligues: mais une grande 
Republique est plus malaisee à diviser: d’autant qu’entre les grands seigneurs et les 
petits, entre les riches et les pauvres, entre les meschans et les vertueux hommes, il s’en 
trouve grand nombre de mediocres, qui lient les uns avec les autres, par moyens qui 
tiennent des uns et des autres, et s’accordent avec les extremitez…41   
 
This passage makes it clear that the ‘petite Republique’ is such not only for its small 
demographic size, but also for its ‘petite estendue’, thus signaling that territorial extension and 
population size go hand in hand.  
However, things are less simple than at first glance. While Bodin is adamant about the 
benefits of a large population, his approval of territorial expansion is not as firm: the question 
is raised at various times in Books 4, 5, and 6, without a clear-cut decision being taken upon it. 
Bodin’s uncertainty might well be due to the inherent complexity of the issue, which cannot be 
resolved on merely demographic grounds. As Bodin himself is well aware, a fully-fledged 
discussion of territorial expansion must pay attention to military matters (is it advisable to 
‘aguerrir les sujets’? What are the benefits and pitfalls of a standing army? Should professional 
troops be preferred over popular militias?), moral quandaries (is offensive war morally 
acceptable? Is justice compatible with expansionism?), and broader political concerns (what 
impact does territorial expansion have on the expanding country? Does it promote internal 
unity or exacerbate existing tensions?). Machiavelli’s famous remarks on the double-edged 
nature of expansion — which at the same time paves the way for states to achieve ‘greatness’ 
and accelerates the process of internal corruption that ultimately causes them to collapse— 
were also likely in the back of Bodin’s mind as he meditated upon such issues.42  
The often meandering discussions of territorial expansion in Books 4, 5, and 6 signal 
an intense effort to come to grips with the complexity of the issue while at the same time 
avoiding simplistic or single-sided solutions. A firm believer in the principle that ‘les 
 
40 Ibidem. According to Bodin, ‘la multitude des citoyens (plus ils sont) empesche tousjours 
les seditions et factions’ instead of provoking them (ibidem). 
41 République, 4.1 (ed. 1579, pp. 534–5). Emphasis added. 
42 See Discorsi, 1.6 and 2.19. For a discussion of Machiavelli’s thoughts on territorial 
expansion and their impact on later thinkers, see Sara Miglietti, ‘Debating Greatness from 
Machiavelli to Burton’, in Early Modern Philosophers and the Renaissance Legacy, ed. by 
Cecilia Muratori and Gianni Paganini  (Dordrecht: Springer, 2016), pp. 239–258.   
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Republiques contraires les unes aux autres, ou bien fort differentes, doivent se regler par 
maximes contraires et differentes’,43 Bodin never seeks to reduce the multiplicity of the real to 
an artificial uniformity; rather, he strives to craft a theory flexible enough to accommodate a 
variety of real-life circumstances, which he explores at length in his treatise.  
Thus, at 5.5, Bodin lends his voice to the (unnamed) proponents of a small, peaceful, 
and demilitarised state ‘iouïssant d’un repos asseuré, et d’une paix sans ennemis, sans guerre, 
sans envie’.44 Violence is certainly justified when it is used for self-defense ‘en extreme 
necessité’; but expansionist wars ought to be avoided at all costs, since they spark off an endless 
chain of ambition and violence (‘la cupidité n’a point de bornes, quoy qu’en apparence on 
promet se contenter, quand on aura conquesté un Royaume’). On the other hand, ‘un petit 
prince, une petite Republique’ enjoy a permanent state of happiness and ‘contentement’. Such 
a state truly embodies the ideal of a ‘Republique bien ordonnee’, since its borders are defined 
by justice rather than force (‘la pointe de la lance’). After laying out the reasons of one side, 
however, Bodin proceeds to present those of the other. According to the advocates of military 
discipline, it is essential to ‘aguerrir son peuple’ and ‘duire les sugets aux armes, non seulement 
defensives, ains aussi offensives, pour faire bouclier aux bons, et rembarrer les meschans’. 
States, indeed, have a moral duty not only to defend themselves but to actively combat evil. 
Nothing is said about territorial expansion; however, the point made here about the legitimacy 
of offensive war is explicitly linked to the problem of expansion in a subsequent passage, which 
discusses the case of a famously small and long-lived state: the republic of Venice. Speaking 
of the latter, Bodin writes:  
 
S’il est ainsi, comme plusieurs pensent, que la guerre ne se doit faire que pour avoir la 
paix, et qu’il suffit pour rendre une Republique bien heureuse, de garder le sien, bien 
murir et fortifier ses places contre l’ennemi, jouïr du fruict de la paix, la Republique de 
Venize se pourroit dire bien-heureuse, ayant l’assiete de sa nature inexpugnable et ne 
se souciant pas beaucoup de conquester, ni alonger ses frontieres.45 
 
Does Bodin agree with this description of Venice — so rich, it should be noted, in 
Machiavellian echoes?46 It is difficult to say. In a Latin addition to 6.4 that considers two other 
aristocratic city-states, Sparta and Geneva, Bodin does seem to endorse their strategy of 
concentrating on ‘domestic discipline’ and refusing to expand. He notes that when the Spartans 
drifted away from this principle and began to ‘covet foreign kingdoms’, they ended up losing 
their own. The Genevans, on the other hand, ‘do not desire that which is of others; they let the 
military art be neglected, and reckon themselves well-advised if they can protect their state 
(which is almost entirely contained within the city walls) and take good care of themselves’.47  
 
43 République, 5.5 (ed. 1579 pp. 747–8). Compare République, 2.1; 4.4. 
44 République, 5.5 (ed. 1579, pp. 752).  
45 République, 5.5 (ed. 1579, p. 756). Emphasis added. 
46 On the longevity of Venice, specifically discussed in the light of territorial and demographic 
matters, see Discorsi, 1.6. Machiavelli also frequently combines the case of Venice with that 
of Sparta and the Swiss city-states, in the same way as does Bodin.  
47 ‘Eo tamen aristocratiae statu Lacedaemonii annos circiter quingentos summa cum militaris 
ac domesticae disciplinae laude floruerunt. Sed cum alienis imperiis inhiare coepissent, suum 
Accepted version before copy-editing. Published in French Studies 72/1 (2018), pp. 17-34 
Does this mean that small states are generally longer lived than large ones? Not 
necessarily. Bodin might find it ‘unsurprising’ that ‘l’Aristocratie des Venitiens, Rhagusiens 
et Luquois, a duré quelques siecles, veu qu’ils ne s’adonnent aucunement aux armes, et n’ont 
rien plus en recommandation que la traffique et l’interest’;48 however, the smallness of Venice 
was described in the Methodus as a hindering rather than a helping factor. Contrasting the tiny 
lagoon republic with the ‘kingdom of the French, unlimited by narrow swamps and extending 
far and wide’, Bodin concluded that the longevity of Venice was to some extent inexplicable 
and ‘contrary to nature’, while the fact that France ‘had flourished through incredibly glorious 
deeds for twelve hundred years’ was ‘in line with nature’.49 Also, as seen above, Bodin 
regarded small states as more vulnerable to civil strife, whereas he thought that a large 
population could prolong the lifespan of a state by acting as a stabilising force. He also 
reckoned that small states were more at risk from external threats, since invading armies could 
subdue them more easily on account of their modest size:  
 
car la proximité du lieu donne appetit à l’ambition de s’emparer de l’estat d’autruy, 
auparavant qu’on y puisse remedier. Dequoy il ne se faut pas esmerveiller, car ceux de 
qui la mer, les montagnes, les deserts inhabitables, ne peuvent arrester le cours 
d’ambition et avarice, comment se contenteroient-ils du leur, sans entreprendre sur 
leurs voisins, quand les frontieres s’attouchent, et que l’occasion se presente? Et cela 
est d’autant plus à craindre, quand la Republique est petite, comme celle de Rhaguse, 
de Geneve, de Lucques, qui n’ont qu’une ville, et le territoire fort estroict: celuy qui 
aura gaigné la ville, gaignera l’estat: ce qui n’advient pas és grandes et puissantes 
Republiques qui ont plusieurs provinces et gouvernemens: car l’un estant pris, est 
secouru des autres, comme plusieurs membres d’un puissant corps qui secourent les 
uns les autres au besoin.50   
 
 
amiserunt. At Genevates non modo aliena non expetunt; quippe qui artem imperatoriam 
desertam esse patiuntur: ac praeclare secum agi putant, si imperium, quod pene iisdem finibus 
quibus urbis moenia, circumscribitur, tueri, ac sibi cavere possint’ (De republica, 4.1, ed. 1586, 
pp. 708–9)  
48 République, 6.4 (ed. 1579, p. 955). 
49 Method for the Easy Comprehension of History, trans. by Beatrice Reynolds (New York: 
Columbia University Press, 1945), p. 273 (‘Ita nostrorum hominum plerique Rempublicam 
Venetorum tandiu, id est, annos circiter DCCC stetisse mirantur, quia id fit repugnante 
natura… regnum vero Gallorum non angustis paludibus contentum, sed longe late patens, cum 
incredibili rerum gestarum gloria MCC annos floruisse non mirantur; quia nihil naturae 
congruens mirum debet videri’: Methodus ad facilem historiarum cognitionem, 6.270, ed. by 
Sara Miglietti [Pisa: Edizioni della Normale, 2013], p. 576). On Bodin’s shifting views on 
Venice, see Cesare Vasoli, ‘Venezia, Bodin e il Colloquium heptaplomeres’, in Mito e antimito 
di Venezia nel bacino adriatico (secoli XV–XIX), ed. by Sante Graciotti (Roma: Il Calamo, 
1997), pp. 117–136.  
50 République, 4.1 (ed. 1579, p. 536).  
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Nevertheless, in this very passage where he criticises the defensive policies of small 
republics such as Venice in the light of a quasi-Machiavellian imperative to ‘expand or die’,51 
Bodin’s description of the neighbours’ insatiable ‘ambition’ and ‘greed’ seems to reveal some 
degree of moral disapproval of expansionist policies. So whose side is Bodin really on?   
A clear-cut answer to this question cannot be found, for the question itself is, in a sense, 
mal posée. Bodin’s exclusion of territorial extension from his definition of the state in Book 1 
is a telling signal that territorial size has no intrinsic value in his eyes: as he points out again in 
Book 4, ‘il ne faut pas mesurer la vertu au pied des richesses, ni la perfection d’une Republique 
à l’estendue de pais’; and he offers the example of the Romans, who ‘ne furent plus puissans, 
ni plus riches, ni plus grands que sous l’Empire de Trajan… et neantmoins l’ambition, 
l’avarice, les voluptez et delices avoyent tellement vaincu les Romains, qu’ils n’avoyent rien 
que l’ombre de l’ancienne vertu’.52 Territorial extension counts little both on the level of 
definition and on that of moral judgment: even the smallest state is still a state, and it can very 
well be a ‘virtuous’ one. The decision on the ‘optimal’ size of a state must therefore be taken 
on different grounds. For Bodin, the matter becomes one of sheer, non-evaluative realism. The 
question that needs to be posed is not ‘What is best?’ but rather ‘What works best?’; and the 
answer will vary from case to case, since ‘what works best’, as we shall see, ultimately depends 
on the constitutional form of the state in question.  
Applying his methodological relativism to the problem of territorial expansion, Bodin 
argues that expansionism is indispensable for popular states, perfectly suitable for monarchies, 
but unimportant and to some extent counterproductive for aristocracies: as he neatly 
summarises at the very end of Chapter 4, Book 6 (‘De la comparaison des trois Republiques 
legitimes’): 
 
tout ainsi donc que les subjects sont bien-heureux sous un grand et puissant monarque, 
s’il a tant soit peu la justice devant les yeux: aussi un petit estat est bien seant à une 
seigneurie aristocratique, et maintient plus heureusement les subjects, que ne feroit un 
povre tyran.53 
 
 Once again, military, moral and political considerations come together in Bodin’s 
meditation on this complex matter. History shows that, without the constant pressure of 
external wars, popular states quickly fall prey to civil strife: expansionism thus acts a sort of 
relief valve that allows to avoid ‘les inconveniens… ausquels l’estat populaire de sa nature est 
suget’ by channeling the excess energies towards the outside. 54  Following Machiavelli, Bodin 
 
51 The necessity of expanding (‘ampliare’) for maintaining (‘mantenere’) is theorised by 
Machiavelli in Discorsi, 2.19. 
52 République, 4.1 (ed. 1579, pp. 508–9). 
53 République, 6.4 (ed. 1579, p. 969). This passage is thoroughly revised in the Latin edition 
(De republica, ed. 1586, p. 716).  
54 République, 5.5 (ed. 1579, p. 760). 
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concludes that popular states should not only not fear to ‘aguerrir les sugets’, they should in 
fact do so systematically, since arming the people is their best chance of survival.55   
Kings, however, should be more careful. While a large kingdom brings glory and 
wealth,56 monarchs should avoid arming all civilians without distinction: it is safer for them to 
opt for a professional army of native citizens, to be kept at the periphery of the country (as did 
Augustus) or outside its borders (as do the Swiss).57 Bodin illustrates this point by arguing that 
all the best-organised states train part of their own people to be ‘gens de guerre’, submitting 
them to a strict discipline from their earliest youth and rewarding them with land and 
privileges.58 Should up to one third of a state’s budget be employed to fund the ‘gendarmerie’, 
Bodin feels that this would be money well spent.59 While insisting that a ‘prince genereux’ will 
not engage in offensive wars out of sheer thirst for power,60 Bodin acknowledges that territorial 
expansion is at times a fundamental need of the state — and fundamental needs of the state are, 
in his perspective, good enough reasons to do things that would not be justifiable otherwise.61 
Besides, monarchies led by a capable ruler are better placed to expand than popular states, 
since the strong leadership ensured by a single commander-in-chief is a key factor of military 
success.62   
As for aristocracies, they are the least disposed towards expansion. The presence of a 
small number of rulers makes it unwise for aristocracies to have a large population, since the 
people could easily outnumber and overthrow those in power, especially when the latter are 
themselves in competition with each other (as Bodin feels is so often the case).63 However, a 
large population is essential for expanding,64 unless one decides to have recourse to allies or 
foreign mercenary troops.65 But neither of these scenarios is ideal, since the state — as 
Machiavelli had already argued — should aim at being self-sufficient from a military 
 
55 See République, 5.5 (ed. 1579, p. 770). This is in line with what Machiavelli writes in 
Discorsi, 2.30. However, Machiavelli’s conclusions are meant to apply to both monarchies and 
democracies, whereas Bodin draws a sharp distinction between the two. 
56 This was a recurrent commonplace in humanist literature on the state: see for instance 
Leonardo Bruni’s Historiae Florentini Populi (6.4) and the comments offered thereupon by 
James Hankins (‘A Mirror for Statesmen: Leonardo Bruni’s History of the Florentine People’, 
online publication, Harvard University, http://nrs.harvard.edu/urn-3:HUL.InstRepos:2958221, 
last accessed 2 July 2017).  
57 République, 5.5 (ed. 1579, p. 760).  
58 République, 5.5 (ed. 1579, pp. 770–772 and 777).  
59 République, 5.5 (ed. 1579, p. 777).  
60 République, 5.5 (ed. 1579, p. 766).  
61 ‘Necessité est un ennemy invincible’ (République, 5.5, ed. 1579 p. 770); ‘Necessité […] n’a 
point de loy’ (République, 4.3, ed. 1579, p. 642).  
62 See République, 6.4 (ed. 1579, p. 961).  
63 See for instance République, 6.4 (ed. 1579, p. 959 and 962–3). 
64 See République, 5.5 (ed. 1579, p. 768).  
65 Bodin considers the possibility of ‘aguerrir les seigneurs seulement’, but concludes that ‘s’il 
n’y a que les seigneurs aguerris, ils seront bien tost defaits, et causeront un changement 
necessaire de leur estat’ (République, 5.5, p. 763).  
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standpoint.66 Aristocracies are thus uncomfortably wedged between the necessity of expanding 
to survive (highlighted at 4.1) and their structural inability to do so safely.  
The demographic dilemma thus seems resolved. A balance between territorial 
extension and size of the population is achieved in all cases: while kingdoms and democracies 
can, and in fact should, engage in expansionist wars to release the pressure of demographic 
growth, aristocracies offer a more static picture, since their small population makes it at the 
same time impossible and unnecessary (at least from a demographic standpoint) to expand. 
Even in the case of monarchies and democracies, however, territorial expansion at the expense 
of the neighbouring countries might not always be a viable course of action. In all such cases, 
Bodin recommends an alternative way, once again drawn from past historical experience, of 
meeting the state’s need for increased space and resources. When confronted with the pressure 
of an exceptional and unsustainable demographic growth, both the Greeks and the Romans had 
had recourse to colonisation: by sending out colonies, they not only ‘chassoyent de leur païs 
les povres, les mutins, les faineans’; they also allowed those ‘dead branches’ to take root and 
thrive in a more fertile soil.67 In addition to this, the settlers guaranteed a stronger presence in 
the newly conquered territories than military garrisons could ever have ensured.68  
Colonialism had yet another advantage in Bodin’s eyes: it enabled a nation to enjoy all 
the benefits of expansion while bringing the costs of war as far away as possible from the 
homeland. In this respect, too, the ancient Romans offered a particularly virtuous example, 
since their large numbers and impeccable military discipline allowed them to ‘aller au païs des 
ennemis faire la guerre, ayans tousjours en Italie des magazins d’hommes d’armes, s’ils 
perdoyent la bataille: et s’ils avoyent la victoire, ils gaignoyent le païs, sur lequel, et au despens 
duquel ils faisoyent la guerre’.69 The Romans were also aware that any successful colonial 
enterprise requires the state to determine exactly of how many citizens it can deprive itself.  
For Bodin, the Roman magistracy of censura served precisely this purpose, allowing the state 
to know ‘le nombre des sugets’ and ‘combien on en pourroit tirer, fust pour aller en guerre, fust 
pour demeurer, fust pour envoyer en colonies’.70 In expressing his wish that this exceedingly 
useful magistracy be reactivated in contemporary France, it cannot be excluded that Bodin may 
have been thinking, among other things, of long-term prospects of colonial expansion.71   
 
 
66 See République, 5.5 (ed. 1579, p. 763 and 774–775). Compare Machiavelli, Discorsi, 2.20. 
67 République, 6.2 (ed. 1579, p. 862). 
68République, 6.2 (ed. 1579, p. 862). 
69 République, 5.5 (ed. 1579, p. 768). 
70 République, 6.1 (ed. 1579, pp. 836–7). 
71 A complete study of Bodin’s views on colonial expansion remains to be done. Helpful 
remarks can be found in Giuliano Gliozzi, Adamo e il Nuovo Mondo. La nascita 
dell’antropologia come ideologia coloniale: dalle genealogie bibliche alle teorie razziali 
(1500–1700) (Firenze: La Nuova Italia, 1977), pp. 326–65; Frank Lestringant, ‘Du Bartas entre 
Du Plessis-Mornay et Jean Bodin: à propos des Colonies’, in Du Bartas, 1590–1990. Actes du 
colloque international d’Auch–Le Bartas–Pau. 6–8 Avril 1990, ed. by James Dauphiné (Mont-
de-Marsan: Editions InterUniversitaires, 1992), pp. 297–314; Joyce E. Chaplin, Subject 
Matter: Technology, the Body, and Science on the Anglo-American Frontier 1500–1676 
(Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2001), pp. 126–7. 
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Conclusions: sovereignty, territory, and population after Bodin 
 
Two opposing and complementary instincts inhabit Bodin’s République: the definitory 
and the operational. Understanding how these two instincts cooperate in the text and in the 
larger economy of Bodinian sovereignty has been the fundamental problem of this article. The 
provisional results achieved here seem to confirm Michel Foucault’s hypothesis of a two-tiered 
nature of sovereign power, which he made forty years ago in his series of lectures on ‘Security, 
Territory, Population’ at the Collège de France. According to Foucault, there exists a gap 
between the ‘idea’ of sovereignty, namely the principle according to which sovereignty is 
theoretically constructed, and ‘the effective, real, daily operations of the actual exercise of 
sovereignty’ (‘l’exercice de la souveraineté dans son déroulement effectif, réel, quotidien’).72 
While the definition of sovereignty excludes the people from its horizon and concentrates on 
an abstract territory — one that is not defined by physical properties such as fertility, elevation 
or extension, but by the juridical fact of being under the rule of one sovereign73 — the actual 
functioning of sovereignty involves constant attention to the population and to its relationship 
with the physical territory.74 There is thus a hiatus between the definition, or, rather, the self-
representation of sovereignty, and the way in which sovereign power actually works.  
 This article has uncovered a similar dynamic in Bodin’s discussion of territorial and 
demographic matters in the République. While any attention to the physical territory is 
deliberately absent from Book 1, which is meant to provide slender definitions for the 
conceptual vocabulary of the République, the final three books of the work contain a rich and 
complex discussion of the relationship between population growth and territorial expansion 
which testifies to Bodin’s level of engagement with such questions. Such a dynamic is doubly 
significant: first, because it demonstrates Bodin’s effort to think about sovereignty both on the 
level of abstract definition and on that of concrete governmental practice; second, because it 
exemplifies Bodin’s frequent strategy of tackling complex questions from multiple 
perspectives. In order to solve such a challenging and longstanding problem as the optimal size 
of a state, Bodin avails himself of all his juridical, moral, military, constitutional, economic, 
and geographical knowledge, carefully weighing the matter by means of both rational 
arguments and historical examples. Just as he seeks to reconcile theory and practice (the 
‘abstract’ sovereignty of Book 1 and the ‘operational’ sovereignty of the following books), 
Bodin strives to think state power in its twofold dimension of juridically legitimate domination 
(i.e. sovereignty) and monopoly of force.  
While Book 1 of the République establishes an equivalence between state power and 
‘puissance souveraine’, thus seemingly defining power in a strictly juristic way, the remainder 
of the work stands to show that force is for Bodin just as essential a component of power as 
 
72 Foucault, Security, Territory, Population, p. 11.  
73 ‘Sovereignty over an unpopulated territory is not only a juridically and politically acceptable 
idea, but one that is absolutely accepted and primary’ (Foucault, Security, Territory, 
Population, p. 11; in the original French, this sentence reads: ‘l’idée d’une souveraineté sur un 
territoire non peuplé est une idée juridiquement et politiquement non seulement acceptable, 
mais parfaitement acceptée et première’). For a helpful clarification of the concept of ‘territory’ 
and other related concepts, see Elden, ‘Land, Terrain, Territory’. 
74 Compare Foucault, Security, Territory, Population, p. 68.  
Accepted version before copy-editing. Published in French Studies 72/1 (2018), pp. 17-34 
formal legitimacy. The former may in fact override the latter in certain cases, as we read in one 
of the chapters that deal more directly with the issue of territorial expansion (5.5): here Bodin, 
clearly mindful of Machiavelli’s lesson, writes that ‘celuy est maistre de l’estat qui est maistre 
de la force’.75  
In light of the above, it seems necessary to reassess recent interpretations that have too 
hastily rubbed out force from Bodin’s conception of state power, thus not only misrepresenting 
Bodin’s own thought, but also drawing questionable conclusions about his positioning with 
respect to both earlier and later authors. For instance, it has been argued that Giovanni Botero’s 
Reason of State (1589) should be read as a systematic attempt to think state power outside of 
the juridical model of sovereignty, specifically using Machiavelli and the Italian humanist 
tradition against Bodin.76 Now, while there is strong evidence that Botero conceived his deeply 
influential treatise on statecraft as part of a larger ‘political and strategic effort made by the 
Roman church to contrast Bodin’s theory of sovereignty’,77 the notion that Botero succeeded 
in proposing a radical alternative to Bodin’s doctrine of the state is at the very least debatable.  
The claim that Botero’s thoughts on territory and population were among his most 
original contributions to the anti-Bodinian campaign underway seems particularly 
misconceived. By basing ‘a large part’ of his political thought ‘on the conditions, causes and 
consequences of demographic growth’,78 Botero was certainly moving a step beyond Bodin, 
who had discussed the topic at length but without ever elevating it to the status of a foundational 
issue. He was not, however, moving against Bodin, whose République actually provided the 
Italian Jesuit with a wealth of historical information and perceptive insights for his own 
reflections On the Causes of the Greatness and Magnificence of Cities (1588), itself a 
manifesto of unrestricted population growth.79 As we have seen, Botero’s efforts to 
reconceptualise the relation between territory and population through what one scholar has 
called a ‘territorialisation of politics’ find precise parallels in Bodin’s earlier work.80  
The supposed gulf between Bodin and Botero’s political outlooks may also be 
reappraised by looking at their respective views on the relationship between state, power, and 
law. This article has shown that Bodin’s doctrine of the state was open to all those non-juridical 
dimensions that Botero would place at the heart of his own political proposition: from 
geography and economy to urban sociology and military strategy. Like Botero, furthermore, 
Bodin was fully sensitive to the Machiavellian discourse of forze (military forces) and to the 
problem of ‘power relationships’,81 as his reflections on how power de facto can supersede 
 
75 République, 5.5 (ed. 1579, p. 774).  
76 See Descendre, ‘Raison d’État, puissance et économie’, p. 317. 
77 Descendre, ‘Raison d’État, puissance et économie’, p. 313. On the vicissitudes of the 
République in late sixteenth-century Rome, see Michaela Valente, ‘The Works of Bodin under 
the Lens of Roman Theologians and Inquisitors’, in The Reception of Bodin, pp. 219–35, which 
helpfully cites most existing bibliography on this topic.  
78 Descendre, ‘Raison d’État, puissance et économie’, p. 314. 
79 See Miglietti, ‘Debating Greatness from Machiavelli to Burton’. 
80 Descendre, ‘Raison d’État, puissance et économie’, p. 315.  
81 Descendre, ‘Raison d’État, puissance et économie’, p. 317. A convincing reappraisal of the 
relationship between Machiavelli, Bodin, and Botero is in Descendre, L’État du monde, pp. 
78–87 and 195–202.   
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power de iure clearly demonstrate. Rather than proposing a radical alternative to Bodin’s 
model, it seems that Botero was working to change the latter from within, building on Bodinian 
foundations to develop his own ‘Christian’ doctrine of the reason of state. Later authors from 
all four corners of Europe would further seize on Bodin’s legacy — not infrequently through 
Botero’s intermediary — to think about statecraft in both its ordinary and extraordinary 
forms.82    
This network of complex and often unexpected ties that link Bodin to his intellectual 
posterity only becomes visible when we move beyond an isolated reading of Book 1 of his 
République to reappraise the work in its entirety. This article has shown that a holistic reading 
of Bodin’s République not only sheds light on neglected aspects of Bodin’s own work, but also 
allows us to situate it more effectively in the context of later developments and to better 
appreciate the broader theoretical enjeux that are at stake in Bodin’s thought. By placing as 
much importance on the non-juridical aspects of a state’s life as on its legal foundations, 
Bodin’s République paved the way to a strand of political reflection that, willingly or not, fed 






82 Artemio Enzo Baldini, ‘Botero e la Francia’, in Botero e la ‘Ragion di Stato’, pp. 335–59; 
Yves-Charles Zarka, ‘État et gouvernement chez Bodin et les théoriciens de la raison d’État’, 
in Jean Bodin: nature, histoire, droit et politique, ed. by Yves-Charles Zarka (Paris: Presses 
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